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Abstract 
 
 
The research presented in this paper is undertaken in response to the debate on capital 
flight from Russia.  This debate usually involves discussion of its determinants but 
misses the question of its ultimate effects on the economy. Lack of understanding of the 
economic nature of capital flight and of its institutional context leads to numerous calls 
for a policy response, such as stricter capital controls, which are not grounded in any 
theory or empirical studies, but at the same time are not opposed on theoretical grounds, 
with only ideological or technical arguments employed at the very best.  The purpose of 
the paper is to examine capital flight from Russia within the institutional environment in 
which it occurs and to establish whether this capital flight has detrimental effect on the 
economy.  New Institutional Economics approach is adopted to argue that in Russia’s 
case capital flight might be considered not just a consequence, as some researchers have 
argued earlier, but also an optimal solution to the institutional deficiencies with its 
economic role being neutral.  To support the validity of this claim modified Granger 
non-causality test is used to determine whether capital flight dynamics have a causal 
effect on that of the interest rate differential and vice versa, that is to test whether price 
mechanism is not working.  Rethinking the nature and the economic impact of capital 
flight allows postulating that within the existing institutional context the observed capital 
flight is a normal economic process which per se does not require any policy response 
and restricting capital flight by imposing capital controls cannot be an element of a pro-
growth policy, as it would instead lead to boom-burst sort of growth.    
 
JEL No.: E61, F21, G18, O16, O24, O52. 
Keywords: Russia, Capital Flight, New Institutional Economics. 
                                                 
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official 
position of the Leontief Center.   
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1 Introduction 
 
 Sustainable economic development is contingent upon policies developed with 
knowledge of the institutional environment.  Misunderstanding of the nature of an 
economic phenomenon and failure to account for its institutional context leads to 
ineffective policy choices, because without knowing relevant causal relationships it is 
impossible to correctly foresee an outcome of a regulation, designed to deal with 
problems thought to be associated with the phenomenon.  Too often causal relationships 
are assumed to be known and considered unambiguous with either no supporting 
evidence or due to the excessive generalization of conclusions applicable to a limited 
range of cases.   
 It happens when the area of policy-making has not been researched sufficiently 
well, as well as, and quite often so, when the focus of the public attention and debate and 
subsequently of the academic research has been so displaced that quasi-knowledge 
forms, which has more to do with supporting public concerns ex-post rather than 
analyzing their validity ex-ante.  Sometimes it is a result of complex economic issues 
being discussed not only among experts but also receiving wide public resonance, being 
addressed in mass media as opposed to professional journals.  Due in part to the 
tendency in the mass media towards sensationalism it usually involves reporting facts 
and experts’ opinions in a very stylized, simplified manner, adapted to the demands of 
the general public.  The same holds true with the rhetoric employed by politicians when 
addressing their electorate.  This approach to the exploration of important issues poses 
danger as it may and often does gradually shift the focus of public discussion as well as 
experts’ attention on to the matters not necessarily pivotal for understanding the problem 
but offering opportunities for easy but simplistic interpretation.  Public opinion thus can 
become a driving force behind mistargeted policies.   
 Among the most vivid examples of such misplaced attention in Russia, and to 
some extent throughout the world, is the issue of capital flight.  Capital flight has come 
to be viewed as a major economic problem in Russia and relevant figures are often 
quoted by mass media in the same manner as consequences of a major catastrophic event 
would be, with numerous politicians readily turning such information into an element of 
their campaigns.  The issue of capital flight is regularly brought up as a sign of a 
looming economic crisis.  In fact it seems that some of this attitude is attributable to the 
very terminology used to describe the issue under consideration; the context in which the 
term capital flight was originally used was associated with events which took place 
during massive economic crises and as this term now tends to be extended to describe 
processes occurring during comparatively normal times, so is the set of expectations 
regarding it possible economic nature and its potential impact on the economy.   
 Somewhat hysterical attitude towards this issue in Russia has not yet managed to 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy, but there is no guarantee that such stereotypical 
perception of capital flight will not lead to some unwarranted and populist steps by 
policy-makers aimed at dealing with the capital flight for instance by imposing stricter 
capital controls.  
 Public fears are not dispelled by a well-weighed discussion of it in the experts’ 
community neither in Russia or abroad; virtually no theoretical response or opposition to 
the view of capital flight as an outtake of economic resources which on its own is 
detrimental to the economy’s growth potential is present.  Calls for imposition of capital 
controls are usually disputed on ideological grounds, but not on the basis of the 
knowledge of the nature and impact of capital flight from Russia.   
 There seems to be a significant knowledge gap in what concerns the issue of 
capital flight, which is especially worrisome since those engaged into economic policy 
design must have a clear vision of what the nature and the effects of capital flight on the 
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economy precisely are, for without this knowledge it is impossible to discuss a potential 
policy response.   
 It should be noted that while capital flight from Russia as well as from other 
emerging and developing economies has long been a topic of research and policy debate, 
the focus of the analysis was on the determinants of capital flight rather than on the 
consequences of it.  A number of researchers adhere to the view that capital flight may 
have negative effect on financial markets and on the economic growth (Loungani and 
Mauro 2000), there being some econometric support to this view (see Powell et al 2002).  
 This view is however not equivocal, and as Schineller (1997) points out, the 
impact of capital flight on the economy is ambiguous, although an extensive discussion 
of it is not offered.  Lack of agreement regarding the nature and the effects of capital 
flight among researchers is reflected in the conflicting policy recommendations.   
 While the calls for capital account liberalization were made by a number of 
economists within the context of Washington Consensus ideas since early 1990-ies, 
there is a certain amount of controversy about whether capital controls on outflows are 
acceptable or even desirable during macroeconomic crises as opposed to normal times.  
Some authors (see, for instance, Krugman 1998) have suggested that restricting capital 
outflows might be a feasible policy option under special circumstances.  Krugman spoke 
of capital controls as a possible element of pro-growth policies for countries 
experiencing massive outflow during crises.  In such scenarios restricting capital 
outflows may be beneficial as it gives policy-makers time to take anti-crisis measures 
until the economy is cured.  The problem is the criterion which will allow classifying a 
situation as a crisis.  Therefore the question of policy response to capital outflows is 
closely linked to the question of what macroeconomic crisis is.  It may not sound like a 
difficult question in case of developed countries but it is obviously a question to be 
asked with respect to emerging economies where the pace of changes is so high that one 
needs to be quite cautious when classifying anything as normal.  The discussion of 
policy options in Russia virtually always implicitly or explicitly involves assumption 
regarding how normal or critical the current economic situation is.  There must be a 
criterion which can help distinguishing the two contexts, as currently it is more a matter 
of psychology rather than economics.  
 The roots of disagreement are however grounded even deeper as there is not a 
clear understanding among economists of the economic impact of capital flight.  When 
economists join the discussion of feasibility of capital controls they tend to do it from 
the perspective of technical feasibility, that is by questioning the ultimate ability of 
policy-makers to effectively carry out such a policy, or even on ideological grounds of 
free trade adherents, rather than by asking whether capital outflows are an appropriate 
object for pro-growth policies at all.  For instance according to the view expressed by 
Edwards (1999) capital controls are not feasible because they are usually easily 
circumvented and encourage corruption. Edwards also postulated that capital controls 
might create a false sense of security among policy-makers who in such case are more 
likely to forego dealing with fundamental problems. Edwards and Santaella (1993) and 
Cuddington (1986) showed that establishing capital controls may send a negative signal 
to investors, stimulating them to increase outflows while circumventing any controls.  
Yet there seems to be no answer for whether capital flight requires policy response even 
hypothetically, in a hypothesized situation of government being fully in control.   
 Potential policy response must be assessed based on the knowledge of what the 
role of capital flight actually is.  The existing gap in theoretical research on capital flight 
calls for the study of capital flight within the institutional context so as to avoid the 
mistake of which Brennan and Buchanan (1985) said that: 
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“Complex analytical exercises on the workings of the market are often 
carried out without so much as passing reference to the rules within which 
individual behavior in those markets takes place” (p.13) 
 
 The purpose of the research presented in this paper is to identify the impact of 
capital flight on the economy as well as to understand the nature of capital flight taking 
into account the institutional environment in which it happens.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the methodology of 
New Institutional Economics is used to formulate an appropriate approach to study and 
to interpret the effects of capital flight and the institutional context in which capital flight 
from Russia occurs is discussed; in section 3 existing approaches to measuring capital 
flight are discussed; in section 4 the data used in the econometric analysis are described; 
in section 5 the testing methodology is presented; in section 6 the empirical results are 
presented; section 7 concludes.   
 
 
2 Putting capital flight from Russia into the institutional context 
 
 From the perspective of New Institutional Economics a market (and this applies 
to capital market too) is seen as a network of relational contracts between economic 
agents, regulated by a set of operational rules (formal and informal) which govern 
transaction activities of inspection, contracting, execution, control and enforcement, and 
concerned with all types of exchange, including the exchange of capital (see Furubotn 
and Richter 1985, pp. 265-285, for the extensive discussion).   
 Since economic agents need to protect their interests in the environment of 
imperfect information and imperfect enforcement mechanisms their choice (or their 
acceptance) of a particular type of market organization is intended to minimize 
transaction costs and therefore limit the potential for opportunism among the market 
participants, thus ensuring that the exchange occurs repeatedly.  In the hypothesized 
world of zero transaction costs and perfect information, it is the level of prices (in case 
of capital market – interest rate) which alone can serve to fully clear the market with 
perfect competition being the optimal market organization.  Once the analysis departs 
from these assumptions it becomes clear that the mode of interaction between buyers 
and sellers, as well as between borrowers and lenders, may take on much more complex 
forms than what neo-classical vision of market implies.     
 High transaction costs related to repeated lending and borrowing may affect the 
evolution of the system of financial intermediation in a way similar to what happens in 
goods markets, which can become segmented due to vertical and horizontal integration 
and formation of conglomerates.  Output of a firm being part of an integrated chain may 
be specifically intended for the use or consumption of other chain members and would 
not enter common market or penetrate barriers protecting competing integrated groups.  
As a result of the segmentation traditional price mechanism would not be able to clear 
the market.   
 Similarly in an institutional environment with high transaction costs of 
information search, inspection, contracting, execution, control and enforcement, capital 
markets may too become segmented, with specific lenders dealing with specific 
borrowers to overcome information asymmetry and to reduce potential opportunism.  
Such segmentation will inevitably hamper the development of domestic financial 
intermediation.  The existence of monopolistic industrial-financial groups in countries 
with relatively poor institutional environment thus may be regarded as a departure from 
perfect market organization which is still optimal as it serves to minimize transaction 
costs.  An interesting conclusion which can be arrived at when extending this line of 
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reasoning further is that if transaction costs associated with lending and borrowing are 
lower abroad than at home, then dealing with foreign borrowers (and under some 
conditions even with foreign lenders) may turn to be the preferred course of action and 
therefore foreign financial intermediaries (financial markets) can actually substitute for 
the domestic ones, quite possibly for the significant degree.  
 In the scenario described above one would expect capital flight to occur and this 
point in one way or another has been explored and tested by a number of researchers.  
For instance Wintrobe (1998) examines the connection between capital flight from 
Russia and such aspects of the institutional environment as poor enforcement of property 
rights, lack of efficient mechanisms of corporate governance, insecurity of investors’ 
and creditors’ rights.  Similarly other researchers exploring the issue of capital flight list 
what can be considered relative deficiencies in institutional environment among the 
determinants of capital flight and test it using data on many nations.  
 The emphasis of most such works is however on the role of institutional factors 
in causing capital flight, not on identifying and explaining its effects.  But if the 
institutional environment forces domestic economic agents to turn to foreign capital 
markets and financial intermediaries, then can it be that capital flight is really an optimal 
solution for the institutional deficiencies?  Adopting the neoinstitutionalist approach to 
the exploration of capital flight will allow understanding not only how institutions affect 
the willingness of economic agents to take capital out of the country, but also how the 
ultimate economic impact of capital flight is predetermined by the institutional context. 
 If domestic capital market is segmented for the reasons described above and if 
capital flight represents an excess over the maximum amount of financing which under 
the existing institutional conditions can be extended by domestic lenders to domestic 
borrowers, then this capital flight per se will have little effect on the economy, if any.  In 
this institutional context capital flight will not only affect economy’s growth potential, 
but will actually defend it from boom-burst type of growth, when misestimating risks 
and the lack of mechanisms to insure against them lead to the expansion of bad credit 
forming credit bubbles.   
 Russia represents an example of poor institutional environment with high 
transactions costs of ensuring property rights and enforcing contracts.  The deficiencies 
in the economy keeping the general level of transaction costs high lead to market 
concentration and low competition in most industries, as well as to the exacerbation of 
principal agent problem in corporate sector and to the concentration of corporate 
ownership and control.  These deficiencies are the basis of the existence of formal and 
informal industrial-financial groups, where investment process is to a large degree 
internalized in a sense that investment decisions as well as the provision of financing to 
investment projects are under less pressure from market forces, which in more 
developed economies make corporations more sensitive to the level of interest rates, 
more flexible in timing their investment decisions, while low degrees of market 
concentration stimulate corporate investors to explore and use a wide range of 
investment opportunities.   There is empirical evidence supporting the notion that 
membership in integrated market structures in Russia serves to mitigate problems 
associated with contracts enforcement and stimulates investment activity within the 
groups (see for instance Volchkova 2001); some researchers spoke of group firms in 
Russia having an internal capital market (Perotti and Gelfer 1998). 
 As some anecdotal evidence suggest up to three quarters of capital flight as well 
as significant portion of all investments is attributable to the firms in energy-sector 
where the dominant form of financing investments into physical capital is internal 
financing or financing through affiliated banks, although this is also true of many other 
sectors.  Approaching the investment process from the microeconomic perspective it 
must be said that the decision to invest in physical capital is rarely a spontaneous one or 
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based on short-term dynamics of interest rates.  Instead, such a decision is taken in the 
context of a long-term investment program, the anticipated cost of financing not being a 
major concern for corporate decision makers, when compared to such considerations as 
anticipated profits for one thing, which due to high market power will as a rule allow 
recovering all costs within a time period incomparably shorter than what corporations in 
developed economies deal with.  In the situation of energy prices and incomes going up 
Russian companies or rather industrial and financial groups constantly find themselves 
earning more than was expected when their investment programs were drawn.  Facing 
the need to allocate the additional earnings they turn to liquid and low-risk instruments 
abroad, with the interest rates at home not being a major consideration, as they do not 
represent a capital market clearing price. 
 Capital flight as stated earlier is to be expected when the overall institutional 
environment seriously obstructs the intensification of financial intermediation at home.  
The excess of financing available for investment is taken out of Russia, but the impact of 
such a capital flight on the investment activity is negligible, because it would not enter 
financial system in a full sense anyway.  Whatever amount of financing is supplied by 
industrial financial groups to the non-affiliated banks and ultimately to other domestic 
investors, it seems to be kept by them growing at a rate consistent with the growth of 
investment opportunities, so as to keep banks balance sheets from significantly 
deteriorating.  Therefore capital flight can be regarded as an alternative to the expansion 
of low-quality credit. 
 To test the validity of the presented approach to hypothesizing about the nature 
of capital flight as well as to evaluate the economic impact of capital flight the following 
implication of it must be reiterated explicitly: if institutional environment leads to the 
segmentation of domestic capital market and to the substitution of domestic financial 
intermediation by foreign financial intermediation, then the relative dynamics of 
domestic interest rates is not to depend on the dynamics of capital flight and vice versa, 
since the changes in the level of domestic interest rates do not in this case represent the 
workings of a price mechanism which would clear the market.  The testing approach 
adopted in this paper is based on this assumption. 
 
 
3 Measuring capital flight 
 
 There is no single agreed-upon measure of capital flight in the literature as there 
is no uniform conceptual approach to the definition of this phenomenon and therefore no 
universally adopted measuring procedure.   
 Some authors, following the tradition set by Kindleberger (1937), believe that 
capital flight should be distinguished from regular capital flows arising in course of 
transnational economic activities.  According to this view capital flight is a subset of 
capital flows which is driven by fears of expropriation, economy-wide default on debts 
and other issues stemming from inefficient or adverse government policies.  More recent 
approach to measuring capital flight defined this way was proposed by Dooley (1986, 
1988); it involves estimation of the changes in the stock of claims on foreign assets not 
subject to taxation and control by the domestic government and therefore not generating 
officially-reported investment income.   
 While such an approach has its merits in terms of theoretical analysis, it is hard 
to use it in practice.  Movement of capital across borders involves flows of varying 
nature, some of them being an inevitable consequence of transnational economic 
activities, of attempts to diversify a portfolio of economic assets, others driven by fears 
or by short term financial or speculative considerations, and still others being result of 
illegal activities, tax evasion and so on.  Motivation of an economic agent behind an 
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investment decision which leads to transnational capital flows often involves a mixture 
of various considerations, so even classifying a single transaction might prove to be a 
difficult task.  Moreover, as some authors have demonstrated the measuring procedure 
might be a subject to significant errors (see Schneider 2003 for the discussion). 
 An alternative point of view, advocated for instance by Tornell and Velasco 
(1992), is that capital flight should be defined in broader terms, essentially as the overall 
outflow of productive resources from the economy.  This approach is more beneficial 
both from the practical point of view, as well as considering the task of studying the 
effects of capital flight on capital markets and investments, because regardless of the 
differences in the potential effects of various components of capital flows considered in 
isolation, it is safe to assume that the eventual consequences for the economy depend on 
overall capital flows. 
 Broad measure of capital flight includes net flows of assets and liabilities held by 
private sector and net errors and omissions, captured in the balance of payments.  Bank 
of Russia reports its estimates of capital flight based largely on this approach.  In this 
paper we will be using the Bank of Russia estimates.  While these estimates is not free of 
flaws and may not reflect capital flight fully, its use is possible and even desirable for 
several reasons.   
 First, it is the figures presented by the Bank of Russia that usually are used in 
public policy debate and in discussions of Bank of Russia policies and it is these figures 
that are cited by public officials in their assessment of and their comments on capital 
flight dynamics.  Second, unlike some indirect estimates of capital flight Bank of Russia 
figures are available on quarterly basis for a relatively extensive period of time and are 
calculated using consistent methodology, which allows for econometric analysis.  
Finally, the magnitude of figures provided by the Bank of Russia is on par with 
alternative estimates, even if exact figures differ.  Thus it seems justified to operate with 
the Bank of Russia estimates for the purposes of analyzing the relationship between 
interest rates and capital flight and especially for the examination of policy arguments 
usually employed in public debate in Russia.   
 
 
4 Basic facts on capital flight from Russia and the description of the data 
 
 The data on capital inflows and outflows used in this paper are provided by the 
Central Bank and are based on the Balance of Payments data for 33 quarters starting 
with the first quarter of 1998 and up to the first quarter of 2006, that is for the period 
following the financial crisis of 1998.   
 Annual net capital outflow from Russia was between 20 – 25 billion US dollars 
(7-11% of GDP) in years 1998-2000, 15 billion US dollars in 2001 (5% of GDP), about 
8 billion US dollars in 2002 (2.5% of GDP), and record low 1.9 billion US dollars in 
2003 (0.5% of GDP), growing again in 2004 to about 8 billion US dollars (1.36% of 
GDP), turning in 2005 into an inflow of 0.9 billion US dollars (0.12%). 
 Capital flight figures expressed as a percentage of GDP on a quarterly basis are 
presented on the graph below. 
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Capital flight from Russia as % of GDP
(on a quarterly basis)
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 It should be noted at this point that analyzing capital inflows and outflows, as 
well as virtually any macroeconomic variables, in a transition economy presents an 
especially challenging task due to the immensity of changes taking place in all spheres 
of social and economic life, which inevitably distorts the way various economic 
processes unfold.  And while it may not be entirely correct to consider that after 1998 
the transition period ended, it is still obvious that the period of 1999-2006 has been 
characterized by far greater macroeconomic and financial stability, clearer definition of 
property rights and lesser uncertainty than the preceding part of 1990-ies.   
 In some sense the crisis of 1998 was the point which marked the resolution of 
several major distortions in the economy, such as overvalued currency, unmanageable 
volume of public debt, persistent budget deficits and so on.  Improvement in those areas 
was of course a result of numerous factors, particularly rising oil prices, but what matters 
for our analysis is simply the fact that in the period we are going to examine there were 
no major macroeconomic or financial shocks in Russia, which makes econometric 
analysis more sensible.  
 The difference between domestic and foreign interest rates (interest rate 
differential) is calculated using the average rates on US dollar denominated loans 
provided by Russian banks to organizations and individuals and US dollar 3-month 
LIBOR.  The former data is from Russia’s Central Bank and the latter is from the British 
Bankers Association.   
 
 
 
5 Methodology 
 
 It can be argued that the approach chosen in the paper to test the impact of capital 
flight on the interest rate differential can be extended to evaluate its economic impact in 
broader sense, which would otherwise require testing quantitatively the connection 
between capital flight dynamics and rates of economic growth.  In any case the problem 
with performing the latter straight-forward econometric exercise is associated on the one 
hand with the availability and the format of data and on the hand with the interpretation 
of the results.  Analyzing appropriate time series for Russia is highly complicated due to 
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the lack of observations except for the later periods, as well as due to the scale of 
changes in the economy during the transition, whose effects on growth rates and capital 
flows are not easily discernable econometrically if at all.  Cross-country comparison and 
subsequent interpretation of the results is also difficult due to the varying nature of 
economic growth and motivation of economic agents taking capital out, in other words 
due to the varying institutional context.  What is also important is that aiming at analysis 
of concrete country-case may prove to be a worthier task from policy-making 
perspective that attempting to formulate fit-for-all universal recommendations.   
 The notion that capital flight might affect growth potential usually rests upon the 
assumption that it makes more difficult for economic agents to obtain financing for their 
investment projects which thus impedes investment activity, a principal driver of 
economic activity.  Hence it is possible to check the validity of such a view by 
estimating the impact of capital flight on the interest rates, whose dynamics is a direct 
indicator of the availability of financial resources.   
 The traditional procedure for testing whether there is a causal relationship 
between variables is based on the concept of causality introduced by Wiener (1956) and 
Granger (1969).  A variable X is said not to Granger-cause another variable Y, if for the 
equation 
 
yt = α + β1yt-1 + β2yt-2 + …. + βpyt-p + γ1xt-1 + γ2xt-2 + …. + γqxt-q + et 
 
where et ~ iid (0, σ2),   the following null hypothesis is true: 
 
γ1 = γ2 = …. = γq = 0. 
 
 In essence the concept of Granger-noncausality rests upon the assumption that if 
one variable is causing another variable, the changes in the former must precede and 
thus must help predict changes in the latter.  
 The traditional procedure for testing non-causality as proposed by Granger 
(1986) required that the variables were not cointegrated.  While procedures exist which 
allow testing for integration and cointegration and further transforming time-series into 
the necessary form, a number of studies (Toda and Yamamoto 1995, Zapata and 
Rambaldi 1997) have demonstrated that such tests and manipulations may be unreliable 
and may lead to a loss of information contained in the original time-series as tests for 
unit-roots and cointegration may be biased. 
 An alternative procedure was developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995), Dolado 
and Lutkepohl (1996), and Zapata and Rambaldi (1997).  According to it the testing for 
non-causality is carried out in the framework of a vector autoregression (VAR), 
augmented in a way which guarantees asymptotic distribution of the modified Wald test 
regardless of whether the time series are stationary, integrated or cointegrated of 
arbitrary orders.  The modified Wald test statistic has an asymptotic χ2 distribution for 
VAR (k + dmax), where k is the lag length and dmax is the maximal order of integration 
present).  The order of integration can be determined using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test and the lag length may be detected using an information criterion, such as Akaike 
Information Criterion or Schwartz’s Bayesian Information Criterion.  After the lag 
length and the order of integration are determined VAR (k + dmax) is estimated and the 
Wald test is performed on the first k coefficients.  
   
 
6 Empirical results 
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 In the first stage of the analysis it is necessary to determine the highest order of 
integration present in the times series under study, which were adjusted prior to this for 
seasonal factors using additive model.  The lag length is selected by looking at the t-ratio 
of the coefficient of the longest lag in the ADF regressions, sequentially estimated down 
from a lag of 5 quarters.  When the optimal lag length is greater than 1 Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test is used, when it is equal to 1 Dickey-Fuller test is appropriate. 
 
Results of Dickey-Fuller / Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots: 
 
 
P-values 
 
 
Variable (Lag) 
Test without 
constant 
Test with 
constant 
Test with 
constant and 
linear trend 
Test with 
constant and 
quadratic 
trend 
In levels: 
CFL  0.08491 07708 6.578e-007 2.994e-007 
IDF  0.2606 0.8949 0.9833 0.819 
In first differences: 
d_CFL 1.518e-012 7.472e-015 1.359e-013 1.443e-024 
d_IDF  0.0358 0.017 0.05611 0.01062 
 
 
 It should be noted that although the results of the test for unit roots based on four 
alternative test modifications are available, it seems that it is the test with constant which 
is consistent with the economic nature of the variables under examination.  It is 
somewhat implausible to consider capital flight relative to GDP as having an inherent 
tendency to grow over long term and thus to model it with a trend; as for the interest rate 
differential, modeling its long term dynamics with a trend is entirely baseless from the 
theoretical point of view.   
 Thus, based on the results of Dickey-Fuller / Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the 
suggested maximal order of integration, dmax, is 1.   
 The optimal lag length for the vector autoregression calculated using Akaike, 
Hannan-Quinn and Schwartz information criteria, k, is 4.   
 The next step is to proceed to the estimation of an augmented vector 
autoregression in levels with 5 lags as k + dmax = 5.    The system takes on the following 
form: 
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 The system is approached as Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations model 
and is estimated using Ordinary Lest Squares method. 
 Estimated system: 
 
tttttt
tttttt
eIDFCFLIDFCFLIDF
CFLIDFCFLIDFCFLCFL
155443
32211
1101.001375.007777.002565.01511.0
0541.00565.00265.004447.00285.00048.0
+−+−++
++−−++−=
−−−−−
−−−−−
 
 R2 = 0.7474 
 Test of the null hypothesis that first 4 IDF parameters are jointly zero: 
 Wald test 7.04 
 Critical value at 10% is 7.78; at 5% -  9.49. 
 Accept the null hypothesis. 
 
tttttt
tttttt
eIDFCFLIDFCFLIDF
CFLIDFCFLIDFCFLIDF
155443
32211
005461.0008906.00226.000618.00111.0
00195.00541.000373.005546.0000235.00009.0
++−−−+
++++++−=
−−−−−
−−−−−
 
 R2 = 0.8719 
 Test of the null hypothesis that first 4 CFL parameters are jointly zero: 
 Wald test 6.82 
 Critical value at 10% is 7.78; at 5% -  9.49. 
 Accept the null hypothesis. 
 
 
 The obtained results suggest that the hypothesis of Granger non-causality cannot 
be rejected at 5% and 10% levels neither in the direction from CFL to IDF, nor from 
IDF to CFL.  In other words we fail to obtain evidence of pronounced effects of capital 
flight on interest rate differential and of interest rate differential on the dynamics of 
capital flight for time horizon over 3 months (1 quarter) long.  These results are 
consistent with the previously stated point that if capital flight occurs because 
institutional environment leads to the segmentation of domestic capital market and 
substitution of domestic financial intermediation by foreign financial intermediation, 
then the relative dynamics of domestic interest rates is not to depend on the dynamics of 
capital flight and vice versa. 
 
 
7 Concluding remarks 
 
 The results of the research presented in this paper demonstrate that net capital 
outflow Russia of the magnitude observed during the period under examination does not 
have a detectable medium- or long-term effect on domestic capital market.  Therefore it 
may be postulated that the observed capital outflow represents a normal process which 
can be regarded as nothing more than an outtake of financial resources in excess of what 
economic agents are willing to extend to domestic borrowers in the existing institutional 
environment, and considering the existing institutional arrangements.  Capital flight 
might be reconsidered as being not just a consequence, as some researchers have argued 
before, but also an optimal solution to the institutional deficiencies with its economic 
role rather being neutral than negative. 
 Knowledge of the economic impact of capital flight and the institutional factors 
behind it allows providing a justification for the liberal calls against imposition of capital 
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controls.  Capital flight of the kind observed in Russia per se does not require policy 
response in form of stricter capital controls which actually can only make things worse, 
because such restrictions do not increase the range of good investment opportunities but 
stimulate instead financing of low quality projects, accumulation of bad debts and credit 
boom which will eventually burst driving the economy into crisis.  In some sense it is 
equivalent to stimulating speculative capital inflows.  Hence restricting capital flight in 
this particular case cannot be a part of a pro-growth economic policy, even if it seems to 
some observers that the situation is a critical one. 
 It is only by taking steps to improve the institutional environment in which the 
investment process occurs that policy-makers can stimulate investment activity, with 
capital flight ceasing as a result of it. 
 
 14
References 
 
 
Brennan, G. and Buchanan J.M. (1985) The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political 
Economy.  Cambridge University Press 
 
Cuddington, J. (1986) Capital Flight: Estimates, Issues and Explanation, Princeton 
Studies in International Finance, No. 58, Princeton University 
 
Dolado, J.J. and Lutkepohl, H. (1996) Making Wald Test Work for Cointegrated VAR 
Systems, Econometric Reviews 15, 369–386 
 
Dooley, M. (1986) Country Specific Risk Premiums, Capital Flight and Net Investment 
Income Payments in Selected Developing Countries, International Monetary Fund, 
Research Department, March, Washington, DC 
 
Dooley, M. (1988) Capital Flight: A Response to Differences in Financial Risks, Fund 
Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, Vol. 35, No. 3, September, 422-436 
 
Edwards, S. (1999) How Effective are Capital Controls?, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 4, 65-84 
 
Edwards, S. and Santaella J.A. (1993). Devaluation Controversies in the 
Developing Countries: Lessons from the Bretton Woods Era. In A Retrospective on the 
Bretton Woods System, Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen, eds. University of 
Chicago Press, 405-55 
 
Furubotn E.G. and Richter R. (1998) Institutions and Economic Theory: The 
Contribution of the New Institutional Economics. The University of Michigan Press 
 
Granger, C.W.J. (1969) Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models 
and Cross-Spectral Methods, Econometrica, 37, 424-438 
 
Granger, C.W.J. (1986), Developments in the Study of Cointegrated Economic 
Variables, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 48, 213-228 
 
Kindleberger, C. P. (1937) International Short-Term Capital Movements, (New York, 
Augustus Kelley)  
 
Krugman, P. (1998) Saving Asia: It’s Time to Get Radical, Fortune, September 7, 74-80 
 
Loungani P. and Mauro P. (2000) Capital Flight from Russia, IMF Policy Discussion 
Paper 00/07, Washington, DC  
 
Powell A., Ratha D. and Mohapatra S. (2002) Capital Inflows and Capital Outflows: 
Measurement, Determinants, Consequences, Business School Working Paper, 
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella 
 
Perotti E.C. and Gelfer, S. (1998). Investment Financing in Russian Financial-Industrial 
Groups, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 242 
 
Schineller, L. (1997). A Nonlinear Econometric Analysis of Capital Flight , Board of 
 15
Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Paper No. 
594. Washington, DC 
 
Schneider, B. (2003) Measuring Capital Flight: Estimates and Interpretations, Overseas 
Development Institute Working Paper 194, March, London, UK 
 
Toda, H.Y. and Yamamoto, T. (1995) Statistical Inference in Vector Autoregression 
with Possibly Integrated Processes, Journal of Econometrics, 66, 225-250 
 
Tornell, A. and Velasco A. (1992) The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: 
Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?, Journal of Political Economy, 
100, 1208-1231 
 
Volchkova N.A. (2001) Does Financial-Industrial Group Membership Affect Fixed 
Investment? Evidence from Russia. EERC Working Paper No 01/03 
 
Wiener, N. (1956) The Theory of Prediction , in: E.F. Beckenback, ed., 
Modern Mathematics for Engineers (New-York, McGraw-Hill), chapter 8 
 
Wintrobe,  R. (1998) Privatization, the Market for Capital Control, and Capital Flight 
from Russia, The World Economy, 21, 603-612 
 
Zapata, H. and Rambaldi, A. (1997) Monte Carlo Evidence on Cointegration and 
Causation, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,59, 285—298 
 
 
